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COMMENT
STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A CASE
COMMENT ON THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
Student-on-student sexual harassment is an increasingly serious and
pervasive problem for society and educational institutions.' Until re-
cently, however, few clear guidelines existed to inform federally funded
educational institutions of their potential liability for failure to identify,
investigate, and punish peer sexual harassment. While Congress enacted
Title IX to prohibit sexual discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance, it was unclear whether
an individual could bring a private damages action against a school board
in cases involving peer sexual harassment.2
In May 1999, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of school liability for peer sexual harassment in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education.3 The Supreme Court held that "recipients of
federal funding may be liable for subjecting their students to discrimina-
tion where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment, and the harasser is under the school's
disciplinary authority. ' 4 The Court based its decision on a series of Su-
preme Court and Circuit Court decisions. First, the Court relied on
Menitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 5 to provide the foundation for the
inclusion of sexual harassment within those discriminatory acts prohib-
1. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Sexual Harassment in Schools, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 301
(1997); see also American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile
Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 7-11 (1993) (finding
four out of five students between the eight and eleventh grades reported having been the target of
sexual harassment).
2. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
3. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
4. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47.
5. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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ited by Title IX.6 The Court also reinforced the notice requirement estab-
lished in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,7 finding that
Title IX inherently requires that the funding recipient receive adequate
notice so that it may adequately assess its potential liability.8 Third, de-
spite the failure of Title IX to expressly authorize a private right of action
by a person injured under Title IX, 9 the Supreme Court relied on Cannon
v. University of Chicago ° to establish an implied private right of action."
The Court further relied on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 2 which held that monetary damages were available for plain-
tiffs claiming a private right of action under Title IX. 3 Finally, the Su-
preme Court adopted the standard developed in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District14 which requires "deliberate indifference" by
the school board to "known acts of student-on-student sexual harass-
ment" before imposing liability. 5
Unfortunately, while resolving the broad question of school
liability for peer sexual harassment, the Court has failed to clarify many
specifics and has generated a series of new controversies. This comment
reviews the jurisprudence surrounding Title IX and Davis, describes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Davis, and seeks to analyze these
controversies, as well as the state of law regarding student-on-student
sexual harassment in light of the Supreme Court's ruling.
6. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
7. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
8. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
9. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
10. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
11. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
12. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
13. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
14. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
15. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-47 (in Gebser, the Court required: "actual knowledge" by a
school official "who at a minimum ha[d] authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures" on behalf of the school district; and "deliberate indifference" by the
school district to the harassed student's rights under Title IX, Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290); see also C.
Scott Williams, Schools, Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 1087, 1094-95 (1999).
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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance."' 16 The impact of Title IX on the education system in the
United States has been widespread. Nearly every educational institution
is a grant recipient that accepts some type of federal financial assistance,
and, therefore, must comply with Title IX or risk revocation of its federal
funding. 7 However, the extent of the impact of Title IX continues to
evolve, reflecting both Congressional amendments that allow for a
broader application of the statute" and attempts by the courts to stretch
the boundaries of Title IX liability. As a result, Title IX has shifted from
a statute used primarily to "implement gender equity reforms in educa-
tion programs and activities into a powerful cause of action for employ-
ees and students seeking money damages for sexual discrimination in
educational programs receiving federal funds."'1 9
By enacting Title IX, Congress sought to close "loopholes in exist-
ing legislation relating to general education programs and employment
resulting from those programs,, 20 and in doing so, deter the use of "fed-
eral resources to support discriminatory practices" and "provide individ-
ual citizens effective protection against those practices.' Specifically,
Congress designed Title IX to bridge "the gender gap[s] in civil rights
legislation" 22 created by Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Congress enacted Title VI in 1964, in an effort to end discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin in any program receiving federal
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (the statute defines education as "any public or private
preschool, elementary or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher
education except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school,
college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means each school,
college or department). 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c).
17. See id. at § 1681 (a).
18. See Julie Carroll Fay, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Is it Really The
Final Word on School Liability For Teacher-To-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31 CONN. L. REV.
1485, 1490-91 (1999) (citing Rehabilitation Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1986)).
19. Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992); Williams, supra note 15,
at 1092.
20. Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Har-
assment and the Standard of Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1021 (1998) (cit-
ing 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)).
21. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
22. Fay, supra note 18, at 1490.
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funding.23 Congress enacted Title VII, on the other hand, to prevent an
employer from discriminating against employees, or potential employ-
ees, with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
,,24national origin. Title VII provides protected classes of employees the
right to work in an environment free from discrimination, intimidation,
and ridicule.2' Like Title XII, Title IX prohibits discrimination based on
sex (shifting the setting from the employment context to the education
context); but the statutory language in Title IX more closely reflects the
language in Title VI, as both statutes prohibit discrimination in institu-
26tions receiving federal funds.
2. Sexual Harassment and Title IX: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson 
7
To establish a cause of action under Title IX, an individual must
demonstrate that: 1) the educational program received federal assistance;
2) the individual was excluded from participating in, denied the benefits
of, or subjected to discrimination in an educational program; and 3) the
exclusion was on the basis of sex .2 As in Title VII, the statutory lan-
guage of Title IX does not explicitly define "on the basis of sex" or ex-
pressly prohibit sexual harassment as a form of discrimination.2 How-
ever, the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR), re-
sponsible for enforcement of Title IX, has adopted two categories of sex-
ual harassment. 30 The evolution of these categories can be traced to Title
VII and the employment context.3'
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, promulgated
guidelines, which expanded the definition of 'exclusion on the basis of
sex' to include sexual harassment,32 thereby making sexual harassment in
23. See § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-2,
2000d-4 (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (emphasis supplied).
25. See Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 306.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996).
29. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1994).
30. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13,1997) [hereinafter 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034];
ED/OCR: Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic Pamphlet [hereinafter ED/OCR Pamphlet]; Karen
E. Edmondson, Davis v. Monroe Board of Education Goes to College: Holding Post-Secondary
Institutions Liable Under Title lXfor Peer Sexual Harassment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1203, 1206
(2000).
31. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
32. See id.
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the workplace a violation of Title VII.33 The EEOC divided sexual har-
assment into two categories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile envi-
ronment harassment.34
Six years later, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the United
States Supreme Court adopted the EEOC guidelines and recognized both
categories of harassment as discrimination "on the basis of sex., 35 In
Menitor, a female bank employee brought Title VII sexual harassment
suit against her employer and her supervisor alleging her supervisor
subjected her to a hostile work environment.36 The Supreme Court held
"that the plaintiff stated a claim under Title VII, and recognized that
'hostile environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
actionable under Title VII." 37
Relying on the EEOC Guidelines and the Menitor decision, the
OCR adopted similar guidelines stating both categories of sexual har-
assment were applicable to the educational context.38 According to OCR
guidelines, quid pro quo harassment "occurs when a school employee
conditions a student's access to educational opportunities on the stu-
dent's compliance with unwelcome sexual conduct."3 9 It can also occur
when an employee causes a student to believe that the employee will
make an educational decision based on whether or not the student sub-
mits to unwelcome sexual conduct.4° Hostile environment sexual harass-
ment "occurs when sexual harassment by an employee, student, or third
party is sufficiently severe to create a hostile educational environment or
interfere with a victim's access to education. ' This type of harassment
includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."4' "Conduct is un-
welcome if the student does not request or invite the conduct, and views
it as offensive or undesirable."43
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985).
34. See id.
35. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that the guidelines "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."
Id.
36. See id. at 60.
37. Id. at 73.
38. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30.
39. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Kelly Dixson
Furr, How Well are the Nation's Children Protected from Peer Harassment at School?: Title IX
Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1583
(2000).
40. See 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30.
41. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, supra note 30; ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Furr, supra note
39, at 1583.
42. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 1, at 307; Furr, supra note 39, at 1583.
43. ED/OCR: Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic Pamphlet.
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3. Notice under Title IX: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman"
Title IX, like Title VI, has been "construed by the Supreme Court as
having been enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of the Constitu-
tion. ' In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Su-
preme Court likened legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' spending
power to a contract, whereby the State or recipient of federal funding
agrees to comply with federally imposed conditions in exchange for fed-
eral funds.46 Thus, Congress's power under the Spending Clause depends
on "whether the state or funding recipient voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the 'contract. ' ' '47 No acceptance of potential liability
can occur if the state or funding recipient is "unaware of the conditions
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it."'48 Therefore, Congress
must speak with a clear, unambiguous voice if it intends to impose a
condition on the receipt of federal funds.49
In Pennhurst, a "mentally retarded" resident of Pennhurst, a state-
operated living facility for mentally retarded individuals, brought suit
against both the facility and the state of Florida alleging inhuman and
dangerous conditions. 50 Florida was a participant in the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Right Act (Act), a federal-state grant
program.51 The resident alleged that the defendants violated his constitu-
tional rights and his statutory rights under the Act (which states that
mentally retarded persons "have a right to appropriate treatment, serv-
ices, and habitation in the setting that is least restrictive of... personal
liberty.").52 The Supreme Court held that the States did not receive ade-
quate notice to be held liable since nothing in the Act or its legislative
history suggests "that Congress intended to require the States to assume
the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least restrictive'
environment to their mentally retarded citizens. ' 3 In other words, Con-
gress failed to speak clearly enough so that the state could make an in-
44. 451 U.S. at 1.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 286 (1998); Fay, supra note 18, at 1491.




50. See id. at 5-6.
51. See id. atl, 11-12.
52. Id. at I (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1) and (2)).
53. id.
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formed choice. 4 As a result, the Court held that Florida was not liable for
monetary damages.5
Consistent with the Pennhurst decision, Title IX "creates a contract
between the government and the educational grant recipient 56 such that a
violation of Title IX by the grant recipient may ultimately result in the
revocation of its federal funds., 57 Therefore, Title IX inherently requires
that the federal government provide the grant recipient with adequate
notice in order to achieve the goal of voluntary compliance. 8 No accep-
tance of liability can occur by an educational funding recipient if the
recipient is unaware or unable to ascertain the conditions or prohibitions
outlined in Title IX.59
4. Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of
Chicago6°
61Title IX does not expressly authorize a private right of action.
62However, in 1979, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court determined that Title IX includes an implied private right of ac-
tion, thereby allowing an individual to bring a private civil suit for sex
discrimination committed by federally funded institutions. 6' The Court
held that a female student, denied admission to two medical schools
which received federal funding, was not limited to administrative reme-
dies for a Title IX violation and "instead had the statutory right to bring a
private civil lawsuit in federal court."64 "The Court inferred that Con-
gress had intended to provide a remedy under Title IX, even though the
language authorizing a private cause of action was absent from TitleI.65
The Court based its opinion on three factors. First, the "plaintiff was
a member of the class for whose benefit Title IX was enacted." 66 Second,
Title IX was "patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"
and "both statutes provide the same administrative mechanism for termi-
nating federal financial support for institutions engaged in prohibiting
54. See id. at 3.
55. See id. at 18.
56. Fay, supra note 18, at 1491.
57. id.
58. See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
59. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
60. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
61. See § 901, 86 Stat. 373, codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Cannon, 441 U.S. at
683.
62. Cannon, 441U.S. at 677.
63. See id. at 689.
64. Id. at 717.
65. Id. at 688-89; Williams, supra note 15, at 1093 (1999).
66. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693-94.
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d .. . . ,67
discrimination. The Court reasoned that a private remedy must be
available under Title IX since "critical language in Title VI had already
been construed as creating a private remedy. 68 Third, a "private remedy
under Title IX would not 'frustrate the underlying purpose of the legisla-
tive scheme' since the use of federal funds by the university justified the
government's interest in a private cause of action. 69 Further, the Court
stated that historically the federal, rather than state, courts have protected
against "invidious discrimination, 70 and, thus, the creation of a federal
remedy would not infringe upon subject matter "traditionally regulated to
state law.'
5. Monetary Damages Under Title IX: Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools
72
The Supreme Court in Cannon, while "permitting a private right of
action under Title IX, limited available damages to equitable and injunc-
tive relief., 73 However, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools74 ,
where a female student alleged that intentional sexual harassment and
abuse by a male teacher made the school environment hostile75, the Su-
preme Court unanimously held that monetary damages were available for
plaintiffs claiming a private right of action under Title IX." The Court
relied heavily on its previous decisions permitting compensatory dam-
ages for claims of intentional discrimination under Title V1.77 Despite the
fact that Title IX is silent "on the issue of available remedies," the Court
presumed all appropriate remedies were available.78 The Court reasoned
"absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute."7 9 After all, "Congress surely
did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the inten-
tional actions it sought by statute to proscribe."80
The Court further noted that the presumption that remedies are lim-
ited under statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of the United
67. Id. at 695-96; Williams, supra note 15, at 1093.




72. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
73. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
74. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.
75. See id. at 63.
76. See id. at 76.
77. See id. at 70.
78. Id. at 66.
79. Id. at 70-71.
80. Id. at 75.
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States Constitution is not applicable to intentional violations. In addition,
the Court held that Title IX unquestionably places on public schools a
"duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminates' on the basis of sex." 8'
6. Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment: Title IX Standard
a. Institutional Liability: Rowinski v. Bryan Independent School
District 12and Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Institute andState University8 3
Unfortunately, the Cannon and Franklin opinions provided "little
guidance regarding the specific analysis of a Title IX sexual harassment
8,4claim or the applicable standard for institutional liability." The Franklin
Court, like many other courts, strongly implied that Title VII principles
were applicable in evaluating Title IX sexual harassment claims within
85schools. Nevertheless, various circuits developed different theories for
86liability.
In Rowinski v. Bryan Independent School District87 , the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that institutional liability would arise only
if "a plaintiff [could] demonstrate that the school district responded to
sexual harassment claims differently based on sex."88 In Rowinski, three
male students repeatedly physically and verbally abused Janet, an eighth-
grade female student, and her sister. 9 One male student regularly swatted
Janet's bottom and made comments such as, "When are you going to let
me fuck you? What bra size are you wearing?" and "What size panties
are you wearing?" 90 The student also groped Janet's genital area and
grabbed her breasts.9' The girls and their mother complained eight times
before the school suspended the male student from riding the bus for
92three days. When another male student allegedly reached up one of the
girl's skirt while making crude remarks, the school suspended him for
three days.93 During class, a third student reached under Janet's shirt and
81. Id. at 75; Williams, supra note 15, at 1094.
82. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
83. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
84. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677,771; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.
85. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
86. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1226.
87. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006.
88. Id. at 1016.




93. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009.
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unfastened her bra.94 The school only suspended the boy for the rest of
the day and the following day, based on the Vice Principal's belief that
the boy's conduct was not sexual in nature.95 The girls' mother brought
suit alleging the school had "condoned and caused hostile environment
sexual harassment., 96 The Fifth Circuit dismissed her complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim under Title IX, finding that the school was liable only
if it treated sexual harassment of boys more or less serious than it treated
sexual harassment of females. 97 In other words, so long as the school
treated harassment consistently, regardless of whether the treatment was
appropriate, the school was not liable.
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit developed a "knew or should have
known standard" in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Institute and State
University.98 Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Tech, was gang raped by
two university football players. 99 Following the rape, she became de-
pressed, attempted suicide, and withdrew from classes.' ° The University
found one of the players guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for a
year, but later, without notifying Brzonkala, set aside the suspension as
excessive, reduced the charge to abusive language, and allowed the foot-
ball player to return on full scholarship.' 0' Brzonkala filed suit alleging
that Virginia Tech, by failing to punish the rapist in any "meaningful
manner," violated Title IX.)° Affirming Brzonkala's claim under Title
IX, the Court held that to succeed in a Title IX hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish: "1) that she [or he] be-
longs to a protected group; 2) that she [or he] was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condi-
tions of her [or his] education and create an abusive educational envi-
ronment; and 5) that some basis for institutional liability has been estab-
lished."'  In reference to the fifth requirement, the Court stated institu-
tional liability would arise if the university "knew or should have known





97. See id. at 1016.
98. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 960.
99. See id. at 953.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 955.
102 See id. at 956.
103. Id. at 958; Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1210.
104. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 960.
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b. School Liability for Teacher Sexual Harassment: Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District°5
Thus, the stage was set for the United States Supreme Court to es-
tablish a consistent standard. In Gebser v. Lago, a female high school
student, allegedly seduced by a male teacher, "asked the district court to
hold the school district liable, because the teacher had subjected her to
sexual harassment sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's education and create an abusive learning environment. '"'
The student's argument, based on agency principles, was rejected by the
Supreme Court in favor of a standard requiring: 1) "actual knowledge"
by a school official " who at a minimum ha[d] authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on behalf of
the school district;" and 2) "deliberate indifference" by the school district
to the harassed student's rights under Title IX.'07 This two-prong test,
used to assess liability for teacher sexual harassment under Title IX, pro-
vided a framework for judicial resolution of peer sexual harassment
cases, and it served as the foundation for the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.
II. DAV1S V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
A. Facts
The petitioner's daughter, LaShonda, was allegedly the victim of a
prolonged pattern of sexual harassment by G.F., a fifth-grade, male
classmate. °8 The harassment commenced in December 1992 and ended
in mid-May 1993 after G.F. was charged with, and pleaded guilty to,
sexual battery.' °9 During this period, LaShonda and her mother, Ms.
Davis, reported a series of incidents involving sexual harassment to
school faculty and administrators." 0 According to LaShonda, G.F. twice
attempted to touch her breasts and genital area making vulgar statements
such as "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your
boobs.""' LaShonda reported both incidents to her mother and her class-
room teacher."12 Furthermore, Ms. Davis contacted the teacher, who as-
105. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
106. Williams, supra note 15, at 1094-95.
107. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995; see also Williams, supra note 15, at 1095.
108. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
109. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 633.
112. See id. at 633-34.
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sured her that she had informed the principal."' However, the school
took no disciplinary action.'
a
The alleged harassment continued when G.F. "placed a door stop in
his pants" and acted in a sexually aggressive manner toward
LaShonda.I 5 LaShonda reported the event to her gym teacher who took
no action.'1 6 Similarly, the school took no action when G.F. engaged in
harassing conduct towards LaShonda in front of yet another teacher,
even though both LaShonda and her mother reported the incident.1 7 De-
spite these reports, G.F. again directed sexually harassing conduct toward
LaShonda during gym class, causing LaShonda to again report the inci-
dent to two teachers. 18 G.F. continued the harassing conduct by rubbing
his body against LaShonda "in the school hallway in what LaShonda
considered a sexually suggestive manner."1 9 Again, LaShonda reported
the matter and told her mother she did not "know how much longer she
could keep G.F. off her."'
20
Other female classmates similarly were victims of G.F.'s conduct,
and a group of female students, including LaShonda, attempted to speak
with the principal, but a teacher denied them access. 12 LaShonda's
mother also spoke with the principal about G.F.. The principal told her
that he would "threaten him a little bit harder" and asked why LaShonda
was the only one complaining. 12 Ms. Davis then complained to the
school superintendent, but the school still took no disciplinary action to
punish or curtail G.F.'s harassing conduct.123 Despite numerous requests,
the school made no effort for three months even to separate G.F. and
LaShonda, who were seated next to each other in class. 124 At the time of
LaShonda's harassment, the County Board of Education "had not in-
structed its personnel on how to respond to peer sexual harassment and
had not established a policy on the issue."'25
113. See id. at 634.
114. See id.





120. Davis, 526 U.S. at 634.
121. See id.
122. Id.; see also Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F.Supp. 363, 364 (M.D. Ga.
1994).
123. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635; Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 364.
124. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 635.
125. Id.
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Because of the harassment, LaShonda's previously high grades
dropped, she was unable to concentrate, and her father discovered she
had written a suicide note.
126
B. Procedural History
Ms. Davis, on behalf of LaShonda, sued the school board and school
officials under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for failure
to remedy G.F.'s sexual harassment of LaShonda. 2 7 Ms. Davis alleged
that: 1) the board was a recipient of federal funding for purposes of Title
IX; 2) "the persistent sexual advances and harassment by" G.F. interfered
with LaShonda's "ability to attend school and perform her studies and
activities"; and 3) the defendant's deliberate indifference to "the unwel-
come sexual advances" of G.F. "created an intimidating, hostile, offen-
sive and abus[ive] school environment in violation of Title IX.,'' 28 The
United States District Court for the Middle Court of Georgia dismissed
the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
129
Specifically, the district court dismissed the suit against the school offi-
cials "on the ground that only federally funded educational institutions
[not School Boards] are subject to liability in private causes of action
under Title IX."'3 ° The Court dismissed the suit against the School Board
because "Title IX provide[s] no basis for liability absent an allegation
that the Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harass-
ment.""'3 Thus, the Court found that peer sexual harassment provides no
ground for a private cause of action under the statute. 1
2
Ms. Davis appealed the decision regarding the school board. 133 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that "Title IX
encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow student or students when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment. ' 34 An en
banc Court then voted to vacate the opinion and grant the school board's
motion for rehearing."' The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
Title IX was passed pursuant to Congress' legislative authority under the
Constitution's Spending Clause'3 6 and that the statute, therefore, must
126. See id.
127. See id. at 634.
128. Id. at 636, quoting the complaint.
129. Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 368.
130. Id. at 367.
131. Davis, 526 U.S. at 636 (quoting Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 368).
132. See Aurelia D., 862 F.Supp. at 367.
133. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (llth Cir. 1996).
134. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193 (borrowing from Title VII law and the language in Franklin, see
supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
135. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418, 1418 (11 th Cir. 1996).
136. U.S CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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provide potential recipients of federal education funds with "unambigu-
ous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept" it.
37
While Title IX provides recipients with notice that they must stop their
employees from engaging in discriminatory conduct, it does not provide
"notice of a duty to prevent student-on-student harassment."''3 8 The dis-
sent argued that by not identifying "the perpetrator of discrimination,
[the statute] encompasses misconduct by third parties."' 39 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine "whether, and under what circum-
stances, a recipient of federal educational funds can be liable in a private
damages action arising from student-on-student sexual harassment.'' 40
C. Majority Opinion
On May 24, 1999, in a majority opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, the United States Supreme Court voted five to four to reverse
the Eleventh Circuit's decision. 41 The Court held that a private Title IX
damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student-on-
student harassment, "but only where the funding recipient acts with de-
liberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or ac-
tivities.' 42 The Court further held that "such an action will lie only for
harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit.'
143
The Court's decision reflects the 'actual knowledge plus deliberate
indifference' test developed in Gebser. 44 In addition, the Court relied on
its holdings Canton, where it held an implied private right action exists
under Title IX; Franklin, where it held monetary damages were an ap-
propriate remedy for violations of Title IX; and Pennhurst, where the
Court established the parameters of the notice requirement for statutes
enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Spending Clause. 45 The
Court also recognized, as it did in Gebser, that liability for damages un-
der Title IX is not based on agency principles. 46
137. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399 (11 th Cir. 1997).
138. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1401.
139. Id. at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
140. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 637 (1999).
141. See id. at 632.
142. Id. at 633.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 642-43; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. at 1995
(1999).
145. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-43.
146. See id. at 643.
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Applying these judicial standards, the Court found that Title IX
"proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity" to satisfy notice require-
ments for Spending Clause legislation, 147 and noted that "the regulatory
scheme surrounding Title IX [and common law] has long provided fund
recipients with notice that they may be held liable for their failure" to
protect students from acts of a third party. 48 However, the court limited
liability for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX "to cir-
cumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.' 49
The court reasoned that by exercising control over the harasser and the
environment in which the known harassment occurs, a school district that
responds with deliberate indifference essentially subjects its students to
the harassment. 50 At a minimum, deliberate indifference must "'cause
[students] to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to
it." '' Whether sexual harassment has occurred depends on factors "in-
cluding, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the
number of individuals involved.' 512 Damages, according to the Court, are
unavailable "for simple acts of teasing and name-calling," even where
these comments target gender differences.13
Contrary to the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights
guidelines, the Supreme Court further limited liability by adopting an
actual notice standard. 5 4 Thus, the courts cannot hold a school liable for
sexual harassment by a third party absent a school official's actual
knowledge of the harassment.
In the instant case, the Court held that petitioners stated a claim.
155
Labeling G.F.'s conduct as "severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive,"' 156 the Court recognized that the School Board was a funding re-
cipient under Title IX and that the Board retained significant "control
over the context in which the harassment occurred".'5 7 Furthermore, de-
spite numerous complaints, the school board made no effort whatsoever
to investigate or put an end to the harassment and, as a result, LaShonda
allegedly suffered harm. 58 Thus, the Court concluded that the Eleventh
147 Id. at 650.
148 Id. at 643.
149. Id. at 645.
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1415 (1966)).
152. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
153. Id. at 652.
154 See id. at 650.
155. See id. at 653-54.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 646.
158. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 634-35.
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Circuit erred in dismissing Ms. Davis' complaint, and the case was re-
manded. 59
D. Dissent
In the dissent, Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) expressed a number of objections to
the majority's opinion. First, the dissent feared that the majority's deci-
sion would allow the federal government to interfere in the historically
state-controlled school system."6 Second, the dissent argued, "neither the
DOE's Title IX regulation nor state tort law... could [or does] provide
states" with the required notice that the statute prohibits the conduct.'
16
Third, the dissent asserted that the majority's decision would trigger a
wave of litigation resulting in an escalation of financial costs and a diver-
sion of scarce resources.162 They further asserted that the decision raises a
series of conflicting interests between the harasser's rights and the rights
of the harasser's victim. 63 Fifth, according to the dissent, the majority
fails to sufficiently define sexual harassment or provide clear
guidelines.' 64 Finally, the dissent argued that Title IX is applicable only




The Supreme Court's opinion in Davis purports to put an end to the
debate of whether, and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal
educational funds can be liable in a private damages action arising from
student-on-student sexual harassment. 66 However, the Court's decision
leaves many questions unanswered and is not without controversy.
Of particular concern is the question of federal interference in, and
potential control of, areas otherwise traditionally outside federal reach. 
6 7
The Court's decision arguably allows the federal government and courts
to set policy, becoming the final arbitrators and ever-present regulators
of school policy.168 The dissent argued that this grant of power fails to
protect state and local government autonomy required by our constitu-
159. See id at 654.
160. See id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
162. See id at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 662-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 663.
167. See id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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tional system. 69 Ultimately, the dissent feared that the introduction of
federal control into the school system "has the potential to obliterate dis-
tinctions between national and local spheres of interest." 7 There was
further concern that the Court's decision "invites courts and juries to
second-guess school administrators in every case to judge ... whether
the school's response was 'clearly unreasonable.'- 1 71 Questioning school
disciplinary action is something the Supreme Court has in the past, con-
sistently refused to do. 17 The dissent feared that ultimately, such inter-
ference could serve to transform every school disciplinary decision into a
jury question.'73 A strong argument can be made that day-to-day deci-
sions concerning school policy, student behavior, and disciplinary en-
forcement are best made by parents, teachers, and school administrators
guided by local- or state-based policy. 174 These entities are arguably bet-
ter able to monitor and react to the needs of local schools and students.
Conversely, increased federal interference may provide much
needed direction. In the past, school administrators, and school employ-
ees have been inconsistent, and often ineffective, in their treatment of
peer sexual harassment. 75 The Davis decision offers some uniformity in
the form of general guidelines to school administrators. Such consistency
could potentially allow schools to quickly address legitimate complaints
and weed out frivolous ones. Furthermore, despite federal interference,
the Supreme Court's decision arguably conferred a degree of deference
to school officials. To avoid liability, school districts "must merely re-
spond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unrea-
sonable.' ' 76 Thus, the Court's standard is flexible enough to accommo-
date different school districts' concerns and procedures.
Notice requirements are a second area of controversy. The Court
addresses several notice issues. First, there was a question as to whether
Title IX provides notice to fund recipients of potential liability for the
acts of third parties. The dissent argued that the Gebser decision makes
clear that the Spending Clause's 'clear and unambiguous notice rule'
"requires both that the recipients be on general notice of the kind of con-
duct the statute prohibits, and-at least when money damages are
sought-that they be on notice that illegal conduct is occurring in a given
situation."'' 77 Arguably, the majority is unfaithful to these principles since
"neither the DOE's Title IX regulation nor state tort law ... could or did
169. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. Davis, 526 U.S. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 678-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 674 ( Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 684 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175.- See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1205.
176. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
177. Id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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provide States the notice required by our Spending Clause principles."'
' 78
Title IX does not give schools clear notice that the conduct the majority
labels peer sexual harassment is gender discrimination within the mean-
ing of the statute, nor does it give notice that the school could be held
liable for money damages for failure to respond to third party discrimi-
nation. 79 The dissent argued "most of the regulations cited by the major-
ity merely forbid grant recipients to give affirmative aid to third-parties
who discriminate." 80 The other regulations "forbid grant recipients to
delegate the provision of student (or employee) benefits and services to
third parties who engage in gender discrimination in administering...
the school's program.,,18' The regulations do not indicate a duty "to rem-
edy discrimination by third parties over whom the school may arguably
exercise some control."' 82 Each DOE regulation is "predicated on a grant
recipient's choice to give affirmative aid to, or to enter into voluntary
association with, a discriminating entity.""83 "The relationships regulated
by the DOE are thus quite different from school-student relationships....
[thereby] confirm[ing] that the regulations did not provide adequate no-
tice of a duty to remedy student discrimination. ' 84
The majority further concluded that state tort law provides states the
requisite notice."' However, they said it is wrong to conclude that a state
knows it is liable under a federal statute simply because the underlying
conduct might form the basis for a state tort action.
186
A related argument is that "Title IX did not give States unambigu-
ous notice that accepting federal funds meant ceding to the federal gov-
ernment power over the day-to-day disciplinary decisions of schools.' 87
Thus, the majority wrongly imposes on the "States liability that was un-
expected and unknown, but the contours of which are... [still] unknow-
able. 188
The Court's decision raises a second notice concern: whether a
school official needs to receive actual or constructive notice of peer sex-
ual harassment before the school can be held liable. The Court has
178. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Davis, 526 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 644.
186. See id. at 668-69 ( Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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adopted an actual notice standard. 89 Such a standard is arguably too high
to protect children and "encourages school districts . . . to [simply] react
to harassment rather than take a preventive stance."' 90 Alternatively, a
constructive notice standard would force schools to develop clear poli-
cies to prevent, control, and detect harassment.' 9' The Court also failed to
clarify who must receive the actual notice in order to impute actual
knowledge to the school. 92 However, given the majority's reliance on
Gebser, an argument can be made for adopting Gebser's requirements.
Gebser required notice to "an official of the recipient entity with author-
ity to take corrective action to end the discrimination."'' 93
A third area of concern is the potentially significant financial costs
associated with the decision. Many school districts are currently admin-
istratively overwhelmed by all types of disciplinary problems, and "lack
the resources even to deal with serious problems of violence. ' 94 The
additional liability imposed by Davis will likely exaggerate this shortfall.
The dissent feared that the Court's opinion is "so broad that it will sup-
port untold numbers of lawyers who will prove adept at presenting cases
that will withstand the defendant school districts' pretrial motions."' 95
Furthermore, the limiting principles developed by the Court are not
likely to prevent litigation. The ease with which Title IX elements can be
alleged and proven could result in a staggering flood of liability and a
corresponding heavy financial burden on school districts, the taxpayers,
and the children they serve. 196 In fact, the cost of defending against a
single peer sexual harassment suit could overwhelm many school dis-
tricts, as the school's financial liability could approach or exceed a dis-
trict's total federal funding.
197
As legal and administrative costs rise, school boards and adminis-
trators will likely divert scarce resources away from basic education
services. 98 Associated costs will also likely rise. For example, the school
districts might be required to provide individual tutoring for those har-
assing students removed from the classroom setting. Potential financial
costs are further exaggerated by the absence of damage caps for judi-
189. See id. at 644; Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Title IX-School District Liability for Student-
on-Student Sexual Harassment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 368, 377 (1999).
190. Furr, supra note 39, at 1597; See also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 189,
at 374.
191. See Furr, supra note 39, at 1596.
192. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1226.
193. Id.
194. Davis, 526 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. See Id. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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cially implied private causes of action under Title IX.' 99 Furthermore, no
provision exists in Title IX for agency investigation or conciliation of
complaints in an effort to eliminate "frivolous suits or settle meritorious
ones at minimal CoSt. ' ' 2°° The depletion of educational resources arguably
was not Congress' intent when it enacted Title IX.
2 0 1
A stronger argument can be made that a school district should be
financially liable if it fails to live up to its responsibility. "It is imperative
that schools create and foster a learning environment that will provide all
students the opportunity to reap the greatest rewards of the prescribed
202
curriculum" in an environment free of sexual harassment. Furthermore,
schools have a responsibility to society to guide and mold impressionable
201
people.2° If a school treats peer sexual harassment with indifference, the
school should bear the financial cost. It should bear the responsibility for
maintaining control and defining appropriate boundaries. If a school fails
to live up to this responsibility, there must be proper measures of ac-
countability. To avoid financial liability under Davis, school districts
need only make a legitimate effort to inspect the complaint, and take
corrective measures.2 °4 Only when the school responds with deliberate
indifference after actual knowledge would it risk liability under Title
Arguably, a consistent approach to peer sexual harassment would
allow school districts to avoid the financial liability. Under Davis, every
school district knows what it needs to do to avoid potential liability.
Therefore, legitimate complaints can be addressed more promptly and
effectively by imposition of these standards. However, consistency is not
likely to eliminate all risk of suit, since a school district under Davis may
risk suit regardless of the consistency or reasonableness of its
206
response.
A fifth concern is a series of potentially costly conflicting interests
arising under Davis and Title IX. First, a "student's demand for a har-
assment-free classroom will conflict with the alleged harasser's claim to
mainstream placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tional Act [IDEA] or with his state constitutional right to continuing free
public education., 20 7 And, the majority does not explain what constitutes
199. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Davis, 526 U.S. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Micheal W. McClain, New Standards for Peer Sexual Harassment in the Schools: Title IX
Liability Under Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 611,618 (1999).
203. See id.
204. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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'equal access to education'. Second, "a student's claim that the school
should remedy a sexually hostile environment may conflict with the al-
leged harasser's claim" that the First Amendment protects his offensive
speech.2 °8 This conflict is especially pertinent when the harassment oc-
curs at universities, which do not exercise custodial and tutelary power
over their adult students.2° In addition, certain states have enacted state
codes that prohibit private schools from encroaching on a student's First
Amendment rights.21 0 Third, "schools that remove a harasser from the
classroom and then attempt to fulfill their continuing education obliga-
tion by placing the harasser in any kind of group setting, rather than by
hiring expensive tutors for each student, will find themselves at continu-
ing risk of Title IX suits brought by the other alternative education stu-
dents., 211 Fourth, "federal law imposes constraints on school disciplinary
actions. 21 2 For example, the Individuals with Disabilities Act places
"strict limits on the ability of schools to take disciplinary actions against
students with behavior disorder disabilities, even if the disability was not
diagnosed prior to the incident triggering discipline. 2 3 If, as the major-
ity represented, the behavior constituting "actionable peer sexual har-
assment so deviates from the normal teasing and jostling of adolestence
that it puts schools on clear notice of potential liability, then a student
who engages in such harassment may have at least a colorable claim of
severe emotional disturbance within the meaning of IDEA.' '21 4 The courts
will need to adequately address these potential conflicts in the future.
What constitutes 'peer sexual harassment' presents a sixth area of
concern for schools and courts. The Davis Court did little to clarify the
boundaries except to note that teasing does not represent sexual harass-
ment.2 " The dissent argued, however, that most students' behavior may
be inappropriate, or even "objectively offensive," at times."' Similarly,
the dissent argued that almost all children are victims of childish behav-
217
ior inflicted by other children at one time or another as they mature.
Absent clear guidelines, the dissent feared that childish, immature be-
havior will be labeled as gender discrimination, and that the fear of li-
ability may breed a climate of alarm that encourages school administra-
tors to "label even the most innocuous of childish conduct sexual har-
assment. ' ,2 However, while unclear cases may arise, there is certainly a
208. Id. at 683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 666-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. See Edmondson, supra note 30, at 1221.
211. Davis, 526 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 676.
216. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
217. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 672-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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difference between childish and inappropriate behavior. Where to draw
the line should arguably be left to the control of local authorities, as this
interpretation is dictated by the circumstances surrounding each case.
What constitutes 'deliberate indifference' is a similar area of con-
cern. The Court's requirement that a school cannot respond in a clearly
unreasonable manner is arguably vague.
A final concern associated with the Davis decision is that of agency.
The dissent argued that the primary purpose of Title IX is "to prevent
recipients of federal financial assistance from using the funds in a dis-
criminatory manner."219 Thus, "Title IX prevents discrimination by the
grant recipient, whether through the acts of its principals or the acts of its
agents.,, 220 Based on this argument, there is "no basis to think that Con-
gress contemplated liability for a school's failure to remedy discrimina-
tory acts by students, or that the States would believe the statute imposed
on them a clear obligation to do so. '221 In fact, according to the dissent,
when Title IX was enacted, the concept of "sexual harassment" as gen-
der discrimination had not been recognized or considered by the
222courts. Nevertheless, the majority rejected an agency limitation on
Title IX thereby expanding the 'enough control' line to encompass stu-
dents. 23 While strong arguments exist on both sides, an even stronger
argument can be made that agency should not be an issue. The Supreme
Court's rationale for imposing liability on schools for a student's sexual
harassment is not to punish the school for the behavior of a student, but
rather to punish the school for failing to remedy persistent, severe,
known acts of sexual harassment.224
Thus, Davis, while resolving the broad question of school liability
for peer sexual harassment, failed to clarify many specifics and generated
a series of new controversies. Future rulings must address these issues. In
the interim, combating peer sexual harassment at the school level will
require a broad, proactive approach encompassing proper training, identi-
fication, investigation and discipline. Such an approach will serve to de-
ter peer sexual harassment and to decrease school liability should har-
assment occur. To decrease the frequency of sexual harassment, schools
225need to adopt clear anti-harassment policies and procedures. These
policies should be published by schools in manuals and presented to all
members of the school community. Students, parents, teachers, and
219. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 663-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 664.
224 See id. at 633.
225. See ED/OCR Pamphlet, supra note 30; Williams, supra note 15, at 1110-12.
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school administrators must be educated as to the scope of peer sexual
harassment and the need for immediate incident reporting to appropriate
school authorities. The types of behavior that constitute sexual harass-
ment need to be identified and strongly condemned.226 There should be
no question of indifference on the part of the school. Schools should de-
velop a reporting system to process complaints and identify several
227
school employees as liaisons for students and parents.
Schools need to adequately inform school employees about Title IX,
the Davis decision, and potential school liability. If a sexual harassment
complaint arises, the school needs to investigate the complaint promptly
and reasonably. The accused harasser should be removed from the class-
room, parents should be notified, and the investigation procedure ex-
plained. The school should maintain detailed records of all interviews
with students and witnesses. Finally, schools need to develop and im-
plement clear disciplinary procedures. Remedial actions must be rea-
sonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent further incidents.
Appropriate action may include official written warning to the harasser,
sanctions, prohibition, potential suspension, or discharge. The discipline
should reflect the students' ages, frequency of inappropriate conduct, and




Davis provides broad guidelines to assess the liability of federally
funded educational institutions for student-on-student sexual harassment.
Federal fund recipients may be liable for subjecting their students to dis-
crimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts
of student-on-student sexual harassment, and the harasser is under the
229school's disciplinary authority.
While Davis offers consistency and general guidelines, it simultane-
ously generates a series of new, unresolved concerns and controversies in
need of clarification. Clearer boundaries will need to be established re-
garding the scope of the federal government's role in state school sys-
tems. Criteria need to be established for balancing the potential financial
costs associated with violations of Title IX with the societal costs associ-
ated with undeterred peer sexual harassment. What constitutes both sex-
ual harassment and deliberate indifference by a school is also in need of




229. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
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solve these issues if peer sexual harassment is to be successfully de-
terred.
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